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Summary  
The main objective of this master thesis is to discuss performance of dynamic safety barriers. 
A comprehensive literature review is performed in order to get understanding what dynamic 
safety barrier is. Three different concepts of dynamic safety barriers based on various 
meanings of dynamic were derived from the literature review:  
-  dynamic safety barriers related to motion or physical force 
- dynamic safety barriers as updated barriers from dynamic risk analysis 
- dynamic safety barriers in the operations with dynamic complexity.   
    Focus in the report is given to barriers in operations with dynamic complexity, where   
barriers vary over the time, the activation of the barrier depends on the current situation, there 
is no pre-made sequence of barrier activation and effect over time of interventions is not 
obvious. In this thesis dynamic safety barriers during drilling operational phase are discussed.  
Literature study on well operations was conducted and concepts such as well integrity, well 
control are discussed. Performance of dynamic safety barriers is discussed based dynamic 
safety on the examples of dynamic safety barriers in drilling- drilling mud and blowout 
preventer. 
  Physical and actuarial approaches to reliability modelling of dynamic safety barriers are 
discussed. Strength- stress interference model of dynamic safety barrier, drilling mud is 
made. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Many incidents and accidents can be traced back to weaknesses in barrier management. This 
has been emphasized by the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) among others, and 
proactive barrier management has been put on the agenda in the oil- and gas industry in 
recent years. During normal operation most safety barriers are dormant in the meaning that 
they will only be activated upon a process upset, and will change status from passive to 
active. Some operations like drilling and well intervention are more difficult to structure since 
it is not always evident which barriers are really in place for a given operation sequence. The 
situation is often referred to as dynamic safety barrier analysis. 
1.2 Objectives 
   The main objective of this master’s thesis is to discuss performance of dynamic safety 
barriers. This done by answering following questions: 
1. What is understood by dynamic safety barriers? 
2. What are the reasonable performance measures related to dynamic safety barriers? 
3. What are the weaknesses in reliability models for static safety barriers when they are to be 
applied on dynamic safety barriers? 
4. How is it possible to distinguish the dynamic behaviour of a safety barrier in the analysis 
phase versus operational phase? 
5. What are the important factors to emphasize when dynamic safety barrier performance is 
to be visualized in operational phase? 
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1.3 Limitations 
   The main limitation is the author practical experience of well operations. Theoretical 
understanding was established based through the literature review, discussions with 
supervisor and industry representatives, but it took much more time than expected and thus 
limited amount of research and practical verification of results. 
Research treats only dynamic safety barriers in the well operations/ Oil and gas industry, 
examples from another industries are not discussed. 
1.4 Approach 
In order to fulfil the objectives of the master’s thesis the following have been performed: 
- a theoretical study based on the literature review on the topics such as dynamic risk 
analysis/assessment, safety barriers, dynamic, drilling operations, reliability models;  
- meetings and discussions with supervisor, Jørn Vatn, through the period of writing the 
thesis;  
- meeting and discussion with PhD candidate Geir Ove Strand (working on “Well drilling 
safety”) on the 8th of October at IPK department; 
-  discussion of findings and conclusions, as well as recommendations for further work in the 
last part of the thesis.  
1.5 Structure of the Report 
Report consists of 5 Chapters. Chapter 1 is introduction, where background is reviewed and 
objectives are set. 
Chapter 2 explains by the literature review what is understood by the concepts of dynamic 
safety barrier. Also fundamental principles of well control are described. 
Chapter 3 treats well barriers and mainly focused on the examples of dynamic safety barriers 
in drilling operational phase. 
Chapter 4 is devoted to reliability modelling of dynamic safety barriers. 
Chapter 5 are conclusions and recommendations for further work
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Chapter 2   
Literature review 
2.1”Dynamic safety barrier” concept in the 
literature 
2.1.1 Introduction 
     In spite of the fact that dynamic safety barrier analysis are applied on the practice, 
discussed in the literature, no common definition of the concept “dynamic safety barrier” has 
been found in the literature. Dynamic risk analyses are mainly focused on the developing of 
accident scenarios and there is no explicit focus on barriers. “Safety barrier” or terms with 
similar meaning such as barrier, independent protection layer are defined and categorised by 
many authors. But what exactly do we mean when we say “dynamic safety barrier”?   
In the online dictionary (Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, 2014) “dynamic” as adjective is 
defined as: 
         - always active or changing 
         - having or showing a lot of energy 
         - or relating to energy, motion, or physical force  
Oxford Dictionaries online (Oxford Dictionaries Language matters, 2014) give the following 
definition of dynamic:  
           “a process or system characterized by constant change, activity, or progress” 
     Same as dynamic has different meanings, so term “dynamic safety barrier” or terms with a 
similar meaning are also found to be used differently.  
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      Also there are many publications on dynamic risk assessment (DRA) methods and safety 
barriers are also part of it. Thus, the dynamic safety barrier concept could also be derived 
from the DRA as shown later in this report.  
     This chapter aims to explain by the literature review and discussion what is understood by 
the concept of dynamic safety barrier. It is also found necessary to present DRA procedure 
for explain dynamic safety barrier concept. 
2.1.2 “Dynamic safety barriers” related to motion or physical force 
     By applying characteristics of “dynamic” to “safety barrier” categories, terms with similar 
meanings such as functional barrier, active barrier, and activated barrier have been found in 
use by different authors. 
     In Hollnagel’s (1999) barriers classification functional (active or dynamic) barriers work 
by impeding the action to be carried out, for instance by establishing a logical or temporal 
interlock. Functional barrier predetermines pre-conditions that must be met by the system or 
human operator before something can happen. These barriers are not always visible by 
operator, but their availability is always pointed out to the system user. Physical or logical 
locks are examples of a functional barrier, first one demands key to be opened and second 
one demands password or identification. 
    In accordance to Kjellen (2000) active barriers “are dependent on actions by the operators 
or on a technical control system to function as intended”. Active barriers are influenced by 
daily operations and operators’ actions are crucial in the quick control of accident risks. In 
case of major accident risks if operators are unable to keep the process in the boundaries the 
technical control system will be activated to control the process. Safety instrumented systems 
are example of active barrier. 
 In CCPS (2001) safety barriers are called protection layers and passive and active 
independent protection layers are defined. Active Independent protection layer is required to 
move from one state to another in response to a change in a measurable process property 
(level, pressure, temperature), or signal from another source. An active independent 
protection layer (see Figure 1) consists of: sensor of some type (instrument, mechanical, or 
human), a decision making process (logic solver, relay, spring, human etc), an action 
(automatic, mechanical, human). Process control systems, safety instrumented systems are 
examples of IPL. 
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Figure 1: Basic components of active IPL (CCPS, 2001) 
       In ARAMIS project (Dianous & Fievez, 2006) activated barriers are defined as a safety 
barrier category. Similar to Hollnagels’ (1999) functional barriers these barriers set up pre-
conditions to be met before the action start. These barriers have to be automated or need 
human action to function.   
     Based on the synthesis of discussed in the literature and industry common characteristics 
of the barriers, Sklet (2006) proposed classification of safety barriers, where he distinguish 
between passive and active barriers. Part of Sklet’s classification related to active barriers is 
illustrated on Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Active barriers classification (Sklet (2006)). 
 
     In accordance to Sklet (2006) active barrier systems often are combination of technical 
and human/ operational elements. They are divided into 3 groups (as explained in Rausand 
(2011)): 
- Safety instrumented system- safety system, which consists of logic controller, sensors 
and activating units, such as valves, engines 
- Other technology safety related system- it is active system that does not have logic 
unit, could be emergency stop button or pressure relief valve 
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- External risk reduction facilities- safety systems that are not part of the protected unit,      
could be ambulances, rescue teams. 
2.1.3 “Dynamic safety barrier” as “updated barrier” derived from dynamic 
risk analysis methods  
      Literature review shows an interest among engineers to dynamic risk assessment (DRA) 
caused by industry demand to increase safety and prevent major accidents. Reason for new 
risk analysis methods is due to inability of classic risk analysis methods to update risk during 
the life of a process. Event tree (ET) and fault tree (FT) are the most popular methodology to 
probabilistic risk assessment, but they are restricted to model dynamic systems as they could 
not catch up changes and deviations which almost always occur in the operational phase. 
There are many efforts in the literature attempting to update conventional fault trees and 
event trees with new observations. Cepin and Mavko (2002) have proposed a dynamic fault 
tree method, which represents extension of classic FT with the time requirements. Bucci et. 
al. (2008) have proposed a methodology that uses Markov modelling to construct dynamic 
FTs/ETs models and addresses the concerns with the traditional ET/FT methodology. 
       In 2006 Meel and Seider have developed plant-specific dynamic failure assessment 
method to predict the frequencies of abnormal events using near misses and incident data, 
helping to achieve inherently safer operations. Failure probabilities of safety systems in the 
method are estimated using Bayesian analysis. Accident precursor data are used to modify 
dynamically the primary estimates of failure probabilities to receive posterior failure 
probabilities. 
      Based on Meel and Seider (2006) method, Kalantarnia, Khan and Hawboldt (2009) have 
proposed dynamic risk assessment method with objective of formation a real time failure 
frequency function of a process. Bayesian theory is used for updating the likelihood of the 
event occurrence and also failure probability of the safety system. Near misses and incident 
data (so called Accident Sequence Precursors- ASP) are required as precondition for this 
method.  
Step-by-step procedure of dynamic risk assessment is shown on Figure 3. DRA may be 
implemented to a selected unit in 5 steps (Kalantarnia, Khan and Hawboldt ,2010): 
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Step 1: Scenario identification 
This step identifies most likely scenarios, consequences, type of failures and related safety 
barriers. A bow-tie model is used to visualize all the possible accident sequences, causes and 
related safety barriers in place to prevent or control hazards.  
Step 2: Prior function calculation 
With all safety barriers and failure frequencies known the next step is to build ET for this 
scenario. Using design stage data or data prior to the start of operation prior failure 
probabilities are calculated. 
Step 3: Formation of likelihood function 
Process real-time data inferred from ASPs are used in this stage to form the likelihood 
function, which is later used to update the prior failure function. 
Step 4: Posterior function calculation 
A posterior failure function of the safety barrier (f(pi|Data)) is obtained from the prior (f(pi)) 
and likelihood functions (g(Data|pi)) using Bayesian inference. Bayesian inference is a tool 
which uses data to improve an estimate of parameter. The posterior function is the same type 
distribution as the prior with the parameters updated by the likelihood function. Using 
Bayesian inference the posterior function can be formulated as shown below: 
f(pi|Data) ∝ g(Data|pi) f(pi) 
Step 5: Consequence analysis  
Consequences analyses are conducted on the scenario in order to estimate the potential 
consequences of all possible scenarios.  
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Figure 3: Dynamic risk assessment methodology (Kalantarnia, Khan, & Hawboldt, 
2010) 
         From the dynamic risk assessment methodology  dynamic safety barrier concept could 
be derived.  Dynamic safety barrier in this case is an updated barrier, meaning that failure 
function of the safety barrier (f(pi|Data)) obtained from the initial generic data in the design 
phase is dynamically updated using Bayesian inference when new data is supplied.  
2.1.4 “Dynamic safety barrier” in the operations with dynamic complexity  
    Barrier systems usually consist of number of barriers to protect from actions and events 
that can lead to major accident. Because of dynamic system behaviour, status and 
performance of barrier systems and their deviations are changing and it is not known what 
barriers are actually in a place. To identify steps in the operation when two barriers are not in 
the place or to identify unreliable barriers combinations dynamic barrier analyses are 
performed (Holand, 1997). Some typical well barriers are shown in a table 1. 
     Holand (1997) distinguish between static and dynamic barrier situations related to the well 
operational phases. A static barrier situation is when same barriers are available for over a 
“long” period of time and production is the most static barrier situation.  
In accordance to Holand (1997) there are three operational phases with dynamic barrier 
situation: 
 Drilling- is the process of drilling a hole in the ground for the extraction of hydrocarbons. 
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It is divided for exploration drilling – drilling to find hydrocarbons or to determine the extent 
of a field and development drilling- is drilling of production or injection wells. In principal 
they are identical, but due to increased reservoir knowledge in the development drilling, the 
blowout frequency is lower for the last one. In this thesis distinction between types of drilling 
is not made. 
Well completion - procedure to prepare a development well for production after drilling is 
finished.  
Well workover – is well maintenance operation. 
During drilling, workover and completion barriers vary over the time, the activation of the 
barrier depends on the current situation, there is no pre-made sequence of barrier activation 
and effect over time of interventions is not obvious. It is common to name barriers during 
dynamic operational phases as “dynamic safety barriers”. But not all well barriers in dynamic 
barrier situation are dynamic. Some barriers are embedded in the well design and they are 
always static, such as casing, tubing they are usually called passive barriers (see table 1). 
 
Table 1: Typical well barriers (Holand, 1997) 
                           
The most hazardous event in the well operations is blowout. SINTEF blowout database 
shows that in the period between 1980 and 1994 most blowouts (82 blowouts out of 125) 
occurred during drilling operational phase (Table 2). Since most blowouts occurred in 
drilling, further in the report focus is given to dynamic safety barriers in drilling operational 
phase. Dynamic safety barriers in the drilling operational phase are drilling mud and blowout 
preventer (BOP) and they are discussed in the Chapter 3. 
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Table 2: Overview of the number of blowouts related to operational phases (Holand, 
1997) 
 
2.2Well control 
     In order to discuss dynamic safety barriers in drilling it is found necessary to describe 
basic principles of well control. This section aims to explain main principles of well integrity 
and kick.  
2.2.1 Fundamental principles and definitions related to the well control 
    Blowouts are among the most undesired accidents during drilling operations which often 
leaving deaths, injuries, great material losses and significant amount of oil spill. In 
accordance to Holand (1997) blowout is “an uncontrolled flow of fluids from a wellhead or 
wellbore”, what means that pre-existing barriers have failed to stop the flow. 
    Blowout is an ultimate consequence of a kick. Kick is unwanted influx of formation fluids 
into the wellbore due to the loss of well control (LWC). A kick can result in blowout if it is 
not detected and prevented in a good time (Khakzad, Khan, & Amyotte, 2013). 
   The safety objective of drilling operations is to reduce the risk of LWC and maintain well 
integrity. Well integrity is defined in the standard NORSOK D-10 (2013) as “the application 
of technical, operational and organizational solutions to reduce risk of uncontrolled release 
of formation fluids”.  Process of maintaining the well integrity and reducing risk of LWC 
trough kick prevention, kick detection, blowout prevention and kill operations is called well 
control (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Steps of well control process (Khakzad, Khan, & Amyotte, 2013) 
The first three steps in figure 4 related to loss of well control and the last one is related to the 
regain of well control and performed only if a blowout can be prevented. Only steps related 
to the well control are discussed in this master thesis. 
   The means to prevent kick, well leakage and blowout in a well are called safety barriers. 
Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (2013) gives the following definition of safety barriers: 
“technical, operational and organisational elements which are intended individually or 
collectively to reduce possibility for a specific error, hazard and accident to occur, or which 
limit its harm/ disadvantages”. 
    Norwegian regulations (NORSOK, 2013) require that during drilling at least two 
independent and tested barriers should be available to prevent undesired events: kick, well 
leakage and blowout. The same principle is followed in UK and USA. Two independent 
barriers are usually called primary and secondary in relation to location to reservoir, primary 
is the closest one (Holand, 1997). 
    During drilling operations operational primary barrier is column of drilling mud. Kick 
occurs if primary well barrier, column of drilling mud, fails in a drilling phase. Drilling mud, 
as safety barrier is aimed to maintain, the wellbore bottom hole pressure (BHP) greater than 
the pore pressure (Pp) but less than the fracturing pressure (Fp). Drilling mud as dynamic 
safety barrier id discussed in the following chapter 3. 
 2.2.2 Overview of causes of kick 
    A kick of gas or oil occurs if following two events happen at the same time:  
1. Penetration of a porous and permeable reservoir with hydrocarbons present 
2. The pore pressure (Pp) is greater than the BHP 
It is important to emphasize that kick will never happen if a porous, permeable and 
hydrocarbon-bearing reservoir has not been penetrated (Tuset, 2014).  The following kick 
causes are different situation, when Pp > BHP: too low mud density, gas cut mud, swabbing 
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and surging, lost mud circulation. Kick causes mechanism is explained in chapter 3 as an 
integral part of performance of primary well barrier, drilling mud. 
2.2.3 Blowout fundamental principles  
       Blowout occurs as a result of failure of the well secondary barriers. Secondary barriers 
during drilling operational phase are the blowout preventer (BOP) combined with structural 
barrier elements such as the wellhead and casing. Kick can escalate to blowout either to 
mechanical failure of the secondary barrier or due to human failure of non-detection of the 
kick and not activating barriers. Whether kick escalate to blowout or not depends on how 
quickly kick is detected and preventive measures are implemented (Khakzad, Khan, & 
Amyotte, 2013).  
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Chapter 3 
Examples of dynamic safety barriers 
This subchapter aims to explain the main principles of dynamic safety barriers during drilling 
operations, drilling mud and BOP preventer, and is mainly based on a theory from Chief 
Counsel's Report (2011). 
3.1. Drilling overview 
      Drilling mud and drill bit are typical components of onshore and offshore drilling consists 
of together with circulating pressures to clear cuttings through the annulus to the surface 
(Figure5). Drilling crew, using drilling mud and rotary drill bits, bore a hole into the ground. 
Drillers pump the mud down through a drill pipe that turns a bit. The mud flows out of holes 
of the drilling bit and then circulates back to the rig through the space between the drill pipe 
and the sides of the well. Mud cools the bit and carries cuttings away from the well. On the 
surface cuttings are sieved out of the mud and mud is pumped back down the drill string. 
 
Figure 5: Drilling the well (Chief Counsel's Report, 2011) 
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3.2. Barriers in a well during drilling 
Figure 3 shows barriers in a well during drilling.  Table 2 provides description and function 
of primary and secondary barriers in the drilling well. Dynamic safety barriers such as 
drilling mud and BOP are also discussed more in detail in the following subchapters. 
 
Table 3: Description and function of safety barriers in a drilling well 
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Figure 6: Barriers in a well (Chief Counsel's Report, 2011) 
 
3.2.1 Drilling mud as dynamic safety barrier  
   Drilling mud, a viscous substance that comes in varying densities, is pumped down through 
the drill pipe and then returns back to the rig through the space between drilling pipe and the 
sides of the well. As it flows, mud viscosity curries pulverized rock (cuttings) out of the well. 
When mud returns to the rig, cuttings are separated and mud pumped back to the drill string. 
When pulling pipe from a well it is very important to keep the hole full of drilling fluids. The 
volume taken out must be replaced by adding drilling mud. Failure to do this may cause 
underbalance. The effectiveness of drilling mud as barrier is reduced when level of fluid in 
the well is dropping. 
   In addition to take cuttings out of the well, drilling mud also controls pressure in the well as 
it being drilled by offsetting the pressure of hydrocarbons and the rock formation. Drilling 
mud, as safety barrier is aimed to maintain, the wellbore bottom hole pressure (BHP) greater 
than the pore pressure (Pp) but less than the fracture pressure (Fp). Mud engineer strive to 
keep the mud weight between these two curves: pore pressure (Pp) and fracture pressure (Fp) 
as shown on Figure 7. Weighting agents are added to the mud to increase it density and, 
therefore, its pressure on the walls. Both pressure gradients are expressed in terms of an 
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equivalent mud weight. Density of drilling mud is typically represented in terms of pounds 
per gallon (ppg). 
 
Figure 7: Pore pressure and fracture gradient (Chief Counsel's Report, 2011) 
    Pore pressure or formation pressure (Pp) is a pressure exerted by fluids within the pores of 
reservoir. If pore pressure exceeds the hydrostatic pressure (Ph) exerted by the mud inside the 
well, the well is underbalanced. This means that the mud pressure is no longer sufficient on 
its own to prevent hydrocarbon flow and unexpected influx or kick of formation fluids in the 
wellbore can happen. If formation pressure increases, mud density should also be increased to 
balance the pressure. Fracture pressure (Fp) is a pressure above which injection of fluids will 
break down the formation. In this situation drilling mud can flow out of the well into the 
formation and circulation is lost. Both formation pressure and fracture pressure vary by depth 
and define boundaries of the drilling process.  
While primary provided by hydrostatic pressure of the mud column, BHP consists of severel 
other pressure components: 
BHP= Ph + Pj – Psw + Psg , 
where Ph  is hydrostatic pressure due to height of the drilling mud column above the wellbore 
bottom, Pj  is frictional pressure due to pumping of the drilling mud through the drillstring, 
Psw and Psg  are swabbing and surging pressures due to drillstring tripping out and tripping in 
the wellbore. The hydrostatic pressure, Ph , can be calculated from the following formula: 
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Ph = ρgh, 
where = drilling mud density, g = gravity, h = drilling mud height.  Therefore, factors that 
either cause h to decrease (annular loses) or ρ to decrease (gas cut mud) result in decline of 
hydrostatic pressure and consequently in BHP. When pulling a drillstring out of the wellbore 
the negative pressure gradient Psw is created which reducing BHP and kick can occur. This 
situation is called swabbing. When drillstring put into the wellbore, positive pressure gradient 
is created  Psg  and this effect is called surging. (Khakzad, Khan, & Amyotte, 2013) 
   The drilling mud barrier properties could also be reduced by lost mud circulation. During 
the drilling, mud circulation applies pressure to the wellbore from dynamic friction necessary 
to push the mud from the well. The resulting equivalent circulating density (ECD) is higher 
than static mud weight and when static mud weight approaches to the fracture gradient 
margin, the applied ECD minimizes that margin. ECD could be increased by different 
reasons: mud pump pressure in applied to the wellbore, mud properties changed and viscosity 
increased, rate of penetration increasing the cuttings load in the annulus. Combination of 
static mud weight, ECD and small margin between mud weight and fracture gradient can 
result in lost circulation of drilling mud (Shaughnessy, 2013).  
The drilling mud barrier may become less effective also due to mishandling mud at the 
surface such as opening wrong valve on the pump and allowing a light weight fluid to be 
pumped, washing off shale shakers, clean-up operations (Wikipedia, 2014). 
To summarise the written above, drilling mud barrier effectiveness problems range from the 
complexity of dynamic pressures changes associated with running pipe to mud mishandling 
errors on the surface. Dynamic pressure changes in the mud column are not always related to 
time they are also situation dependent: how much cuttings are added to drilling fluid and 
taken to surface and how this effects density of the drilling mud, how much fluid has to be 
pumped into the well and what is fluid density . Also some result of analysis (Tuset, 2014) 
shows that human error causing dynamic pressure changes in the mud column are the most 
critical for primary well control during the operation.  
3.2.2 BOP as dynamic safety barrier 
Blowout preventer (BOP) is specialized valve or similar mechanical device which consists of 
series of rams and annual preventers used to seal, control and monitor oil well. BOP is 
considered as single barrier. Figure 6 shows BOP position in a well. BOP is barrier to flow 
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only when it closed. BOP is dynamic barrier, to close off the well and prevent hydrocarbons 
flow – individual rams in BOP has to be closed to handle different situation. It takes from 40 
seconds to a minute to close a ram when activated. 
                                
Figure 8: Blowout preventer (Chief Counsel's Report, 2011) 
Different parts of BOP are shown in Figure 8: 
   An annular preventer is a large rubber seal designed to close around the drill pipe and seal 
off the annulus. If there is pipe in the annular preventer, the annular preventer seals around it, 
even if pipe is rotating.  Regulations require that an annular preventer be able has to 
completely seal the entire opening, but they are not as effective as ram preventers to close an 
open hole; 
   A pipe ram is designed to close around the drill pipe and seal off the annulus in the well 
below. Variable bore rams are a type of pipe ram with several concentric semi-circular pieces 
which allow sealing around several different sizes of pipe; 
   A blind shear ram consists of two metal blocks with blades. It is designed to cut the drill 
string and seal off the annulus and the drill string in the well below. It can withstand and seal 
a substantial amount of pressure from below. Blind shear rams are designed to cut even 
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through drill pipe, but will not cut through a tool joint (the place where two pieces of pipe are 
threaded together), casing hangers, or multiple pieces of pipe; 
   The casing shear ram is designed to cut through casing as it is being lowered into the 
wellbore and when there is no drill string in place. It does not seal the wellbore completely; 
  A test ram, if installed, sits at the bottom of the BOP stack and resist downward pressure. If   
BOP and test ram are closed than BOP can be pressure-tested above the ram. 
     Each ram of BOP is activated separately. BOP rams can be activated manually from the 
rig, robotically by remotely operated vehicles, and automatically (when certain conditions are 
met).  
    BOP is seen as dynamic safety barrier, because its ability to seal the well is changing in 
different situations: where is a pipe, what size of pipe. BOP also could not seal due to 
improper position of drill pipe tool joint as drill pipe position is not known in every moment. 
Also BOP barrier properties are reduced due confusion regarding responsibilities to close 
BOP. 
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Chapter 4 
From examples to theory 
4.1. Performance measures of dynamic safety barriers 
     Petroleum Safety Authority in Norway (2013) recommends that performance requirements 
have to be established for technical, operational and organisational barrier elements. 
   Based on experience from several projects and a synthesis of the reviewed literature Sklet 
(2006) recommends the following measures to characterize the performance of safety 
barriers: 
• Functionality/effectiveness: The ability to perform a specified function under given 
technical, environmental, and operational conditions 
• Reliability/availability: The ability to perform a function with an actual functionality and 
response time while needed, or on demand 
• Response time: The time from a deviation occurs that should have activated a safety barrier, 
to the fulfilment of the specified barrier function 
• Robustness: The ability to resist given accident loads and function as specified during 
accident sequences 
• Triggering event or condition: The event or condition that triggers the activation of a barrier 
4.2 Reliability modelling of dynamic safety barriers 
  In hardware reliability 2 different approaches are used: physical approach and actuarial 
approach.  
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4.2.1 Introduction to physical approach 
   In the physical approach the strength of a technical item is modelled as a random variable S. 
The item is exposed to a load L that is also modelled as random variable. The distributions of 
the strength and the load in specific time t are illustrated in Figure 9. 
                          
Figure 9: Load and strength distribution (Rausand & Høyland, 2004) 
A failure occurs as soon as load is higher than strength. The reliability R of the item is 
defined as the probability that the strength is greater than the load, 
R= Pr(S>L) 
The load vary in time and may be modelled as a time – dependent variable L(t). The strength 
of item is also function of time, S(t). The time to failure T of the item is the time until         
S(t) < L(t), 
                                                             T=min {t; S(t)<L(t)} 
The reliability R(t) of the item maybe defined as R(t)=Pr(T>t) (Rausand & Høyland, 2004) 
This physical approach is often called “stress-strength interference model”. 
4.2.2 Stress-strength interference model for dynamic safety barriers 
As discussed in chapter 3, drilling mud, as safety barrier is aimed to maintain, the BHP 
greater than the pore or formation pressure (Pp). If formation pressure exceeds the hydrostatic 
pressure (Ph) exerted by the mud inside the well, this means that the mud pressure is no 
longer sufficient on its own to prevent hydrocarbon flow and unexpected influx or kick of 
formation fluids in the wellbore can happen. Weighting agents are added to the mud to 
increase it density and, therefore, its pressure on the walls.  
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Figure 10: Probability density functions of formation pressure and Mud density at 
specific time t 
 
 
Drilling mud as a safety barrier is exposed to stress, which is formation pressure S2(t). Mud 
density in this situation is strength, S1(t). Strength – stress interference model of dynamic 
safety barrier “drilling mud” at a specific time t is shown on the figure 10. Figure 10 shows 
probability density functions of stress (which is formation pressure as given in the example 
above) and strength (which is mud density or movement of BOP ram). Probably normal 
distributions are not totally realistic, but still can be used for graphical representation. If we 
select enough strength to handle the worst case stress situation, this will shift strength curve 
to the right reducing potential failure region or even avoiding failure. 
     Safety barrier fails as soon as stress is higher than strength. Reliability of the safety barrier 
could be defined as R(t)=Pr(T>t), where  T=min {t; S1(t)<S2(t)}. 
   Theoretically, if we have probability density function of pore pressure and mud density, we 
can calculate the reliability of safety barrier analytically or numerically. But practically, it is 
often difficult to know the exact distribution of stress and strength. Also dynamic barrier can 
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be exposed to stresses from different directions and have to be modelled as vectors what 
makes analysis complex.  
4.2.3 Actuarial approach 
   In the actuarial approach all the information about component loads and strengths is 
described in the probability distribution function F(t) of the time to failure T. No explicit 
modelling is needed. Reliability characteristics like failure rate and are deduced directly from 
the probability distribution function F(t). When few components are combined into a system, 
the analysis is called system reliability analysis (Rausand & Høyland, 2004) 
In order to build a reliability model logical structure of components should be created. Event 
tree (ET) and fault tree (FT) are the most popular methodology to probabilistic risk 
assessment, but they are restricted to model dynamic systems as they could not catch up 
changes and deviations which almost always occur in the operational phase. Reliability 
models are designed to illustrate static relationships between logical variables and do not treat 
time, process variables, human behaviour which affects the system response. In drilling apart 
from static parameter such as formation porosity, there are also dynamic parameters such as 
the formation temperature and pressure which are different on different levels of the well. 
Also drilling parameters such as the weight and volume of drilling mud are always sensitive 
to unexpected changes such as losses in formation, gas in the well.  
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Chapter 5 
Summary and recommendations for further work  
 
5.1 Summary and conclusions 
   The main objective of this master thesis is to discuss performance of dynamic safety 
barriers. A comprehensive literature review is performed in order to get understanding what 
dynamic safety barrier is. Three different concepts of dynamic safety barriers based on 
various meanings of dynamic were derived from the literature review:  
-  dynamic safety barriers related to motion or physical force 
- dynamic safety barriers as updated barriers from dynamic risk analysis 
- dynamic safety barriers in the operations with dynamic complexity.   
    Focus in the report is given to barriers in operations with dynamic complexity, where   
barriers vary over the time, the activation of the barrier depends on the current situation, there 
is no pre-made sequence of barrier activation and effect over time of interventions is not 
obvious. In this thesis dynamic safety barriers during drilling operational phase are discussed.  
Literature study on well operations was conducted and concepts such as well integrity, well 
control are discussed. Performance of dynamic safety barriers is discussed based dynamic 
safety on the examples of dynamic safety barriers in drilling- drilling mud and blowout 
preventer. 
  Physical and actuarial approaches to reliability modelling of dynamic safety barriers are 
discussed. Strength- stress interference model of dynamic safety barrier, drilling mud is 
made. 
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5.2 Recommendations for further work 
 
Unfortunately due to luck of time and family situation not all set objectives are met. 
“Dynamic safety barriers performance” is very interesting and important research topic and in 
further work would be practically useful to analyse: 
- How is it possible to distinguish the dynamic behaviour of a safety barrier in the analysis 
phase versus operational phase?  
-  Important factors of dynamic safety barrier performance visualization in operational phase. 
Dynamic safety barriers in industries other than oil and gas are also recommended for further 
work.
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Appendix 1 
Pre-study report 
1. Background 
Many incidents and accidents can be traced back to weaknesses in barrier management. This 
has been emphasized by the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) among others, and 
proactive barrier management has been put on the agenda in the oil- and gas industry in 
recent years. During normal operation most safety barriers are dormant in the meaning that 
they will only be activated upon a process upset, and will change status from passive to 
active. Some operations like drilling and well intervention are more difficult to structure since 
it is not always evident which barriers are really in place for a given operation sequence. The 
situation is often referred to as dynamic safety barrier analysis 
2. Objectives 
The objective of this master thesis is to structure, model and visualize the performance of 
dynamic safety barriers.  
3. Approach 
The objective should be fulfilled mainly through literature: papers, books or thesis 
4. Problems to be addressed 
The Master thesis is divided in five tasks listed below with a short comment of how the work 
is planned to be executed and/or challenges 
Activity 1: To discuss what is really understood by the concept of a dynamic safety barrier 
This task is important foundation for the thesis and will give a better understanding of 
dynamic safety barrier.  Different understandings of dynamic in the literature should be 
discussed, but focus should be given to operational dynamic.  
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Activity 2: To discuss and propose reasonable performance measures related to dynamic 
safety barriers 
Activity 3: To discuss weaknesses in reliability models for static safety barriers when they 
are to be applied on dynamic safety barriers  
Activity 4: How is it possible to distinguish the dynamic behaviour of a safety barrier in the 
analysis phase versus operational phase  
Activity 5: To emphasize important factors of dynamic safety barrier performance 
visualization in operational phase 
Activity 6: To summarize, conclude and give recommendations for further work 
5. Work scope 
The Master thesis is done over 20 weeks and how these weeks will be distributed between the 
tasks, completion and proofreading is shown in the table below. Activity “planning” includes 
start up, planning the project and writing the pre-study report. Completion consists of writing 
preface, abstract, conclusions. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Milestones: 
Activity/week 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41
Planning
Activity 1
Activity 2
Activity 3
Activity 4
Activity 5
Completion
Proof-reading
Project plan- Master Thesis, Performance of dynamic safety barriers
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20.06.14 –  Pre-study report 
08.10.14- Master thesis submission 
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